Kurundkar G.D, Naik N.A, Dr.Khamitkar S.D / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com Vol. 2, Issue 2,Mar-Apr 2012, pp.1288-1296 Network Intrusion Detection using SNORT

Kurundkar G.D^{*} Naik N.A** Dr.Khamitkar S.D***

*(Dept. of Computer Science SGB College,Purna Dist.Parbhani)
 **(Dept. of Computer Science Yeshwant Mahavidyalaya ,Nanded Dist.Nanded)
 ***(School of Computational Sciences, SRTM University,Nanded(MS)India)

Abstract:

An intruder is a hacker or cracker which always tries to get access to secure, system intrusion occurs when an unauthorized person try to gain access or interrupt the normal operations of an information system. Even when such attacks are selfpropagating, as in the case of viruses and distributed denial-of service attacks, they are almost always initiated by an individual whose purpose is to harm an organizational data. Intrusion detection consists of procedures for detection of illegal activity of (intruders) system that identify the intruders. Some important intrusion prevention activities are writing and implementing good activity information security rule, planning and performing effective information security programs, installing and testing technologybased information security system for counting intruders activities such as firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems. In Information security intrusion detection systems (IDS) works like a burglar alarm in that it detects destruction and activates an alarm. Recently new technology for IDS systems is the intrusion prevention system (IPS), which can detect an intrusion and also prevent that intrusion from attacking the organization. There is a system called intrusion detection/prevention system (IDPS).Recently Snort is a very useful tool for Network based Intrusion detection. A Snort is tool which can give alert/alarm to the authentic user or Network Administrator by sending email or giving alarm for illegal network activities.

Key Words: Intruder, Prevention, Measurers, attacks, Snort, Activities, Detection, Session, MD5

Need of Intrusion Detection System

When we are working on the Internet it becomes our responsibility make our network more secure by using Network monitoring tools and making security settings and there are several other reasons to use an Intrusion Detection System.

- To detect attacks that are not prevented by other security measures
- To detect and deal with attacks
- To perform as quality organize for security design and administration, especially of large and complex enterprises
- To provide useful information about intrusions that do take place, allowing improved finding, improvement, and correction of contributing factors

1. Network Based Intrusion Detection and Prevention System

A Network Based IDS (NIDS) present in a computer or device connected to a segment of an organization's network and monitors network traffic on that network segment, looking for ongoing attacks. In network for maintain security to files many various Hashing algorithms are used like MD5. When a circumstances occurs that the network-based IDS is planned to know an attack, it responds by sending notifications to administrators. NIDS looks for attack patterns within network traffic, such as large collections of related items that are of a certain type that could specify that a denial-of-service attack is ongoing, or it looks for the exchange of a sequence of related packets in a certain pattern, which could indicate that a port scan is in progress. NIDSs are installed at a specific place in the network e.g router from where it is possible to watch the traffic going into and out of a particular network segment and it can be used to watch specific host computers on a network segment, or it can be installed to monitor all traffic between the systems that make up an entire network. A fundamental problem for network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) that passively monitor a network link is the ability of a skilled attacker to *evade* detection by exploiting ambiguities in the traffic stream as seen by the NIDS [1].

2. Network Behavior Analysis System

Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) systems examine network traffic in order to identify problems related to the flow of traffic. Network Behavior Analysis, or shortly, was initially designed as a security technology whose purpose is to identify un-usual traffic on the network being supervised [2]. They use a description of the anomaly detection technique described later in this section to identify excessive packet flows such as those that might occur in the case of equipment failure, denialof-service attacks, virus and worm attacks, and some forms of network policy violations.NBA.

3. Host Based Intrusion Detection System

A Host Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) is situated on a particular computer or server, known as the host, and monitors activity only on that system. Hostbased intrusion detection systems can be further divided into two categories: signature-based (i.e. misuse detection) and anomaly detection [3]. HIDS monitor the status of key system files and detect when an intruder creates, modifies, or deletes monitored files. The HIDS then triggers an alert when one of the following changes occurs: file attributes change, new files are created, or existing files are deleted. A HIDS has an advantage over NIDS in that it can usually be installed in such a way that it can access information that is encrypted when traveling over the network.

Usefulness of HIDS

- Logs. A HIDS can detect local events on host systems and also detect attacks that may avoid network-based IDS.
- HIDS encrypted traffic will have been decrypted and is available for processing.
- The use of switched network protocols does not affect a HIDS.
- A HIDS can detect inconsistencies in how applications and systems programs were used by examining the records stored in audit

Drawbacks of HIDSs

- A HIDS is vulnerable to some denial-of-service attacks.
- A HIDS can use large amounts of disk space to retain the host OS audit logs, and, to role properly, it may require disk capacity to be added to the system.
- A HIDS can inflict a performance overhead on its host systems, and, in some cases, may

reduce system performance below acceptable level

Intrusion Detection Prevention System Methods

IDPS provides multiplicity of detection methods to monitor and calculate approximately network traffic, following are some important methods. **I. Signature Based Intrusion Detection System:**

Signature-based detection is normally used for detecting known attacks. A signature-based ID is useful in data traffic which search patterns that match known signatures that is, preconfigured, predetermined attack patterns. Signature-based IDS technology is widely used because many attacks have clear and distinct signatures. In signature-based IDS is that every signature requires an entry in the database, and so a complete database might contain hundreds or even thousands of entries. Each packet is to be compared with all the entries in the database. [4]

II. Statistical Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection System:

In statistical-based techniques, the network traffic activity is captured and a profile representing its stochastic behavior is created. This profile is based on metrics such as the traffic rate, the number of packets for each protocol [5]. Anomaly-based intrusion detection triggers an alarm on the IDS when some type of unusual behavior occurs on your network. This would include any event, state, content, or behavior that is considered to be abnormal by a pre-defined standard [6].

The Statistical Anomaly based IDS or behavior-based IDS collects statistical summaries by observing traffic that is known to be normal. This normal period of evaluation establishes a performance baseline. The data that is measured from the normal traffic and is used to prepare the baseline can include variables such as host memory or CPU usage, network packet types, and packet quantities. The advantage of the statistical anomaly-based approach is that the IDS can detect new types of attacks because it is looking for abnormal activity of any type.

III. Stateful Protocol Analysis Intrusion Detection Prevention System:

Stateful inspection improves on the functions of packet filters by tracking the state of connections and blocking packets that deviate from the expected state. As with packet filtering, stateful inspection intercepts packets at the network layer and inspects them to see if they are permitted by an existing firewall rule, but unlike packet

filtering, stateful inspection keeps track of each connection in a state table. While the details of state table entries differ by firewall product, they typically include source IP address, destination IP address, port numbers, and connection state information. [7] Stateful protocol analysis (SPA) is a process of comparing predetermined profiles of generally usual definitions of benign activity for each protocol state against observed events to identify deviations. By storing relevant data detected in a session and then using that data to identify intrusions that involve multiple requests and responses.

Intrusion Detection Prevention System Response

Intrusion prevention systems (IPS), also known as intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS), are network security appliances that monitor network and/or system activities for malicious activity. The main functions of intrusion prevention systems are to identify malicious activity, log information about said activity, attempt to block/stop activity, and report activity. [8] Intrusion prevention systems are considered extensions of intrusion detection systems because they both monitor network traffic and/or system activities for malicious activity. The main differences are, unlike intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems are placed in-line and are able to actively prevent/block intrusions that are detected. [9][10] In this IDPSR it has a number of response options, depending on the policy, objectives, organization's and system capabilities.

The following are some of the responses that an IDS.

- alarms
- E-mail messages
- Log entries
- Evidentiary packet dumps
- Take action against the intruder
- Reconfigure firewall
- Terminate session
- Terminate connection

Selecting Intrusion Detection System Products

Now a day's various Intrusion detection products are easily available, according to security goals and organization considerations. It performs variety of features. The process of selecting products that represent the best fit for any specific organization's needs is challenging.

Technical and Policy Considerations

• What is your systems environment?

- What are the technical specifications of your systems environment?
- What are the technical specifications of your current security protections?
- What are the goals of your enterprise?
- What are your security goals and objectives?
- Is your organization concerned about insider attacks?
- Does your organization want to use the output of your IDS to determine new needs?
- Does your organization want to use IDS to maintain managerial control over network usage?
- What is your existing security policy?
- What is the budget for acquisition and life cycle support of intrusion detection hardware, software, and infrastructure?
- Is there sufficient existing staff to monitor an IDS full time?
- Does your organization have authority to instigate changes based on the findings of IDS?

Case Study Snort on Centos:

Cento is an Enterprise-class Linux Distribution derived from sources freely provided to the public by a prominent North American Enterprise Linux vendor. Cento conforms fully to the upstream vendor's redistribution policy. Cento is free. Cento is developed by a small but growing team of core developers. In turn the core developers are supported by an active user community including system administrators, network administrators, enterprise users. managers. Centos has numerous advantages over some of the other clone projects including: an active and growing user community, quickly rebuilt, tested, packages, an extensive mirror network, developers who are contactable and responsive, multiple free support avenues including IRC Chat, Mailing Lists, Forums. Centos overtook Debian to become the most popular Linux distribution for web servers.

Snort:

Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system utilizing a rule-driven language, which combines the benefits of signature, protocol and anomaly based inspection methods. With millions of downloads to date, Snort is the most widely deployed intrusion detection and prevention technology worldwide and has become the in reality standard for the industry. Snort is used primarily to passively monitor network traffic and generate alerts when threats are detected. More recently, the Inline mode of deployment has become available and

can be used to actively intercept and drop network traffic. The essence of Inline mode is that, a) Snort is configured and deployed on a server that forwards/routes network traffic as opposed to only sniffing network traffic and, b) Snort "alert" rules are changed into "drop" rules. Many Linux distributions include the iptables firewall application and Snort Inline interacts with iptables to receive and process network traffic. Appropriate iptables rules are used to direct

network traffic to Snort Inline for inspection according to Snort rules. Given this interaction between Snort Inline and iptables, successful configuration of Snort Inline depends on successful

configuration of iptables. Accordingly, these notes provide an example of an iptables rule set that

supports both integration with Snort Inline and interoperability.

Components of Snort

Snort is logically divided into multiple components. These components work together to detect particular attacks and to generate output in a required format from the detection system. A Snort based IDS consists of the following major components:

- Packet Decoder
- Preprocessors
- Detection Engine
- Logging and Alerting System
- Output Modules

Fig.1.1 shows how these components are arranged. Any data packet coming from the Internet

enters the packet decoder. On its way towards the output modules, it is either dropped, logged or an alert is generated.[11]




Fig.1.1 Components of Snort.

A brief introduction to these components is presented in this section.

1. Packet Decoder

The packet decoder takes packets from different types of network interfaces and prepares the packets to be preprocessed or to be sent to the detection engine. The interfaces may be Ethernet,

SLIP, PPP and so on.

2. Preprocessors

Preprocessors are components or plug-ins that can be used with Snort to arrange or modify data packets before the detection engine does some operation to find out if the packet is being used by

an intruder. Some preprocessors also perform detection by finding anomalies in packet headers and generating alerts. Preprocessors are very important for any IDS to prepare data packets to be

3. The Detection Engine

The detection engine is the most important part of Snort. Its responsibility is to detect if any intrusion activity exists in a packet. The detection engine employs Snort rules for this purpose. The rules are read into internal data structures or chains where they are matched against all packets. If a packet matches any rule, appropriate action is taken; otherwise the packet is dropped. Appropriate actions may be logging the packet or generating alerts.

4. Logging and Alerting System

Depending upon what the detection engine finds inside a packet, the packet may be used to log

the activity or generate an alert. Logs are kept in simple text files, tcpdump-style files or some other form. All of the log files are stored under /var/log/snort folder by default. You can use –l command line options to modify the location of generating logs and alerts. Many command line options discussed in the next chapter can modify the type and detail of information that is logged by the logging and alerting system.

5. Output Modules

Output modules or plug-ins can do different operations depending on how you want to save output generated by the logging and alerting system of Snort. Basically these modules control the

type of output generated by the logging and alerting system. Depending on the configuration, output modules can do things like the following:

• Simply logging to /var/log/snort/alerts file or some other file

- Sending SNMP traps
- Sending messages to syslog facility

• Logging to a database like MySQL or Oracle. You will learn more about using MySQL

later in this book

- \bullet Generating extensible Markup Language (XML) output
- Modifying configuration on routers and firewalls.
- Sending Server Message Block (SMB) messages to Microsoft Windows-based machines

How to Protect IDS Itself

One major subject is how to protect the system on which your intrusion detection software is running. If security of the IDS is compromised, you may start getting false alarms or no alarms at

all. The intruder may disable IDS before actually performing any attack. There are different ways

to protect your system, starting from exceptionally wideranging recommendations to some sophisticated methods. Some of these are mentioned below.

• The first obsession that you can do is not to run any service on your IDS sensor itself. Network servers are the most common method of exploiting a system.

• New threats are discovered and patches are released by vendors. This is almost a continuous and non-stop process. The platform on which you are running IDS should be patched with the latest releases. For example, if Snort is running on a Microsoft Windows machine, you should have all the latest security patches from Microsoft installed.

• Configure the IDS machine so that it does not respond to ping (ICMP Echo-type) packets.

• If you are running Snort on a Linux machine, use net filter / iptable to block any unwanted data. Snort will still be able to see all of the data.

Snort with no IP Address Interface

You can also use Snort on an interface where no IP address is assigned. For example, on a Linux machine, you can bring up interface eth0 using command "ifconfig eth0 up" without assigning an actual IP address. The advantage is that when the Snort host doesn't have an IP address itself, nobody can access it. You can configure an IP address on eth1 that can be used to access the sensor itself. This is shown in Fig.1.2.




Fig. 1.2 Snort sensors with two interfaces. One of these has no IP address assigned.

On Microsoft Windows systems, you can use an interface without binding TCP/IP to the interface, in which case no IP address will be assigned to the interface. Don't forget to disable other protocols and services on the interface as well. In some cases it has been noted that winpcap (library used on Microsoft Windows machines to capture packets) does not work well

when no IP address is assigned on the interface. In such a case, you can use the following method.

• Enable TCP/IP on the network interface that you want to use in the stealth mode. Disable everything other than TCP/IP.

• Enable DHCP client.

• Disable DHCP service.

This will cause no address to be assigned to the interface while the interface is still bound to TCP/IP networking.

Network Intrusion Detection Mode

Intrusion detection is a new retrofit approach for proving a sense of security in existing and data network while allowing them to operate in their current "open" mode. [12] In intrusion detection mode, Snort does not log each captured packet as it does in the network sniffer mode. Instead, it applies rules on all captured packets. If a packet matches a rule, only then is it logged or an alert is generated. If a packet does not match any rule, the packet is dropped silently and no log entry is created. When you use Snort in intrusion detection mode, typically you provide a configuration file on the command line. This configuration file contains Snort rules or reference to other files that contain Snort rules. In addition to rules, the configuration file also contains information about input and output plug-ins.[11][13] The typical name of the Snort configuration file is snort.conf. We have previously saved snort.conf configuration file in /opt/snort/etc directory along with other files. This was done during the installation procedure. The following command starts Snort in the Network Intrusion Detection (NID) mode:

Snort Alert Modes

When Snort is running in the Network Intrusion Detection (NID) mode, it generates alerts when

a captured packet matches a rule. Snort can send alerts in many modes. These modes are configurable through the command line as well as through snort.conf file. Common alert modes are explained in this section. To explain the alert modes, I have used a rule that creates an alert when Snort detects an ICMP packet with TTL 100. This rule is listed below.

alert icmp any any -> any any (msg: "Ping with TTL=100"; \ttl:100;)

Sending Alerts to Syslog

This command allows Snort to send alerts to Syslog daemon. Syslog is a system logger daemon

and it generates log files for system events. It reads its configuration file /etc/syslog.conf where the location of these log files is configured. The usual location of syslog files is /var/log directory. On Linux systems, usually /var/log/messages is the main logging file. For more information, use the "man syslog" command. The "man syslog.conf" command shows the format of the syslog.conf file.

Sending Alerts to Windows

Snort can send alerts to Microsoft Windows machines in the form of pop-up windows. These pop-up windows are controlled by Windows Messenger Service. Windows Messenger Service must be running on your Windows machine for pop-up windows to work. You can go to Control

Panel and start the *Services* applet to find out if Windows Messenger Service is running. The *Services* applet is found in the Administrative Tools menu on your Windows system. Depending

on your version of Microsoft Windows, it may be found in Control Panel or some other place.

Working with Snort Rules

Like viruses, most intruder activity has some sort of signature. Information about these signatures is used to create Snort rules. But we can use honey pots to find out what intruders are doing and information about their tools and techniques. In addition to that, there are databases of known vulnerabilities that intruders want to exploit. These known attacks are also used as signatures to find out if someone is trying to exploit them. These signatures may be present in the header parts of a packet or in the payload. Snort's detection system is based on rules. These rules in turn are based on intruder signatures. Snort rules can be used to check various parts of a data packet. Snort 1.x versions can analyze layer 3 and 4 headers but are not able to analyze application layer protocols. Upcoming Snort version 2 is expected to add support of application layer headers as well. Rules are applied in an orderly fashion to all packets depending on their types. A rule may be used to generate an alert message, log a message, or, in terms of Snort, pass the data packet, i.e., drop it silently. The word pass here is not equivalent to the traditional meaning of pass as used in firewalls and routers. In firewalls and routers, pass and drop are opposite to each other. Snort rules are written in an easy to understand syntax. Most of the rules are written in a single line. However you can also extend rules to multiple lines by using a backslash character at the end of lines. Rules are usually placed in a configuration file, typically snort.conf You can also use multiple files by including them in a main configuration

file. This chapter provides information about different types of rules as well as the basic structure of a rule. You will find many examples of common rules for intrusion detection activity at the end of this chapter. After reading this chapter, along with the two preceding chapters, you should have enough information to set up Snort as a basic intrusion detection system.

User Defined Actions

These rule actions can be used for different purposes, such as:

• Sending messages to syslog. Syslog is system logger daemon and creates log file in /var/log directory. Location of these files can be changed using /etc/syslog.conf file. For more information, use "man syslog" and "man syslog.conf" commands on a UNIX system. Syslog may be compared to the event logger on Microsoft Windows systems.

Port Number

The port number is used to apply a rule on packets that originate from or go to a particular port

or a range of ports. For example, you can use source port number 23 to apply a rule to those packets that originate from a Telnet server. You can use the keyword *any* to apply the rule on all

packets irrespective of the port number. Port number is meaningful only for TCP and UDP protocols. If you have selected IP or ICMP as the protocol in the rule, port number does not play

any role. The following rule is applied to all packets that originate from a Telnet server in 192.168.2.0/24, which is a class C network and contains the word "confidential": alert tcp 192.168.2.0/24 23 -> any any \ (content: "confidential"; msg: "Detected confidential";)

To detect this type of TCP ping, you can have a rule like the following that sends an alert message: alert tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 any (flags: A; \ ack: 0; msg: "TCP ping detected";)

Kurundkar G.D, Naik N.A, Dr.Khamitkar S.D / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com

: View Favorites Tools Help		Basic Analysis and Basic Analysi	ecurity Engine (BASE) : Source tes Tools Help	Port(s) - Microsoft interi	ner-explorer		
• 🕤 · 🖹 🗟 🏠 🔎 Search 👷 Favorites 🔣 🙆 - چ 🔳 - 🛄 🎇	8	🕞 Back + 🍙 -	👔 👔 🌈 🔎 Search 👷	Favorites 🚱 🔗 🍃	🖬 - 🗔 🛍 8	8	
http://192.168.0.31/base/base_stat_dass.php?sort_order=dass_a	So Link		0.31/base/base_stat_ports.php				
cia Analycia and Security Engine /P		A Regio	nalucia and (Socurity E	naine (PA		
sic Analysis and Security Engine (B	Dasic P	nalysis and S	Security El		NOE)		
Search		Home Search					
	[Back]						
on : Sun December 18, 2011 15:25:59 teria any			cember 18, 2011 15:31:54				
ia any		IP Criteria	ny				
Criteria none Criteria any		Pavload Criteria	one ny				
Displaying alerts 1-12 of 12 total			s) (full) - on 1 alert(s) (in 94 blobs		erts 1-48 of 94 total		
< Classification > < Total # > < Sensor # > < Signature > < Source Address					Deal All	e Fired	
misc-activity 3168 (53%) 1 8 21 attempted-admin 15 (0%) 1 2 3	23 2011-12-11 17:19:18 2011-12-17 17:24:22 10 2011-12-12 11:51:17 2011-12-12 15:31:51	< Po	alo] [sstats] 1	12	ie Alerts > < Src. Addi 5 8	2 2	< First > 2011-12-12 12:15:52:2011-
unsuccessful-user 2011 (33%) 1 1 3 attempted-dos 1.0%) 1 1 1	1 2011-12-12 11:53:31 2011-12-12 15:18:36 1 2011-12-12 12:13:46 2011-12-12 12:13:46	139 / tcp [sans] [1028 / tcp [sans]		2023	2 4 1 1		2011-12-12 11:53:31 2011- 2011-12-12 12:24:38 2011-
attempted-dos 1 (0%) 1 1 1 shellcode-detect 93 (2%) 1 3 17	1 2011-12-12 12:13:46 2011-12-12 12:13:46 24 2011-12-12 12:15:52 2011-12-17 17:14:28	1047 / udp [sans]	tantalo] [sstats] 1	•	1 1	1 2	011-12-12 15:02:47 2011-
attempted-user 11 (0%) 1 3 6	2 2011-12-12 12:15:52 2011-12-17 16:23:43	1054 / tcp [sans]		6	1 1		011-12-17 16:22:54 2011-
policy-violation 37 (1%) 1 2 3 troise-activity 65 (1%) 1 1 2	9 2011-12-12 12:17:22 2011-12-17 16:30:39 5 2011-12-12 12:19:11 2011-12-17 16:22:59	1057 / udp [sans]		6	1 1 1 1		2011-12-12 15:03:43 2011- 2011-12-17 16:19:30 2011-
trojan-activity 65 (1%) 1 1 2 rpc-portmap-decode 19 (0%) 1 2 2	5 2011-12-12 12:19:11 2011-12-17 16:22:59 19 2011-12-12 12:21:09 2011-12-17 16:32:28	1087 / udp [sans]		1	1 1	1 2	011-12-12 16:02:44 2011-
otocol-command-decode 18 (0%) 1 1 1	7 2011-12-12 12:21:19 2011-12-12 12:39:05	1114 / tcp [sans]		1	1 1		2011-12-12 15:08:02 2011-
suspicious-login 571 (10%) 1 1 1 misc-attack 1.0%) 1 1 1	1 2011-12-12 12:21:52 2011-12-12 12:22:04 1 2011 12:12 12:22:05 2011 12:12:22:06	1162 / tcp [sans] 1197 / tcp [sans]		1	1 1 1 1		2011-12-12 15:13:22 2011- 2011-12-12 16:07:26 2011-
	1 2011-12-12 12:22:36 2011-12-12 12:22:36	1201 / tcp [sans]		1	1 1		2011-12-12 16:08:04 2011-
ACTION { action }	ted ALL on Screen	🗌 1203 / tcp [sans]	tantalo][sstats] 1	2	2 1		2011-12-12 11:51:17 2011-
		1209 / tcp [sans]		1	1 1	1 2	2011-12-12 12:13:46:2011-
	🔮 Internet	http://ports.tantalo.net/				source_ip_Addre	🔮 Int
		™ istart) © ⊄	Fig. 1.4 ar		st 24 hou	ırs listing	g alerts
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	Resix Analysis and Secu	Fig. 1.4 ar throu ty Engine (BASE) : Query Results: 151	ıd 1.5 La gh E-mai	st 24 hou	ırs listing	g alerts
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	Base Analysis and Secu- Fie Ed: Yow Higory	Fig. 1.4 ar throu trone (845): Query Results 151 Boolmarks Dois Hol	nd 1.5 La gh E-mai	st 24 hou l on SNC	urs listing DRT BAS	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	Besix Analysis and Secon Fie Sit: Your Nigory Andersioschypage	Fig. 1.4 ar throu trone (845): Query Results 151 Boolmarks Dois Hol	ad 1.5 La gh E-mai as TCP Alerts - Macilla Fredor early Engine (BASE_X_1 Pro	st 24 hou l on SNC	ers listing ORT BAS	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	Besix Analysis and Secon Fie Sit: Your Nigory Andersioschypage	Fig. 1.4 ar throu tytope (MS2) (Qery Zendis 151 golnaris jois jois sec Analysis and S	ad 1.5 La gh E-mai as TCP Alerts - Macilla Fredor early Engine (BASE_X_1 Pro	st 24 hou l on SNC	urs listing DRT BAS	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	 ■ Bask Analysis and Secon ■ E & Yew Réport ■ Pobles backs page ■ Pobles backs page ■ Pobles backs page ■ Adder 1 den(1) bit Pie Alet (a 	Fig. 1.4 an throug by topic (MSC) 30 cerry Acousts 151 goldnets gold gibl × Beak Analyse and 5 base ory panylophen=150er4=1706 cte	ad 1.5 La gh E-mai as TCP Alerts - Macilla Fredor early Engine (BASE_X_1 Pro	st 24 hou l on SNC benkedrypage	urs listing DRT BAS	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	Best Andysk and Security	Fig. 1.4 ar throughe (ASC) (Gerry Sestills 151 generals 306 (BH)	nd 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder surly Engre (BXE _ × 1. Per ale=left Lightan_sed_rose=	st 24 hou l on SNC ben kedry page ikednit-Let 10 Summary St • Sceners	urs listing DRT BAS	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	Best Analysis and Score Be Str. Yew Heavy Anoten loading page Adder 1 add(3) thre Adet o Queridian : Le Faturey	Fig. 1.4 ar throughe (ASC) (Gerry Sestills 151 generals 306 (BH)	nd 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder surly Engre (BXE _ × 1. Per ale=left Lightan_sed_rose=	st 24 hou l on SNC ben bedrig pope ilectric Les 10 ²	urs listing DRT BAS	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE -	ge Displaying Snort window. ©©© r & & ASE) [Back] Summary Statistics . Senors	Base Analysis and Secon Fie Exit yow Higory A Poblem loading page If 21 388 3.016ee Added 1 aint(1) the Alert Vereid on: The Fatory Mets Criteria 1 aint P Criteria 2 aint	Fig. 1.4 ar throughe (ASC) (Gerry Sestills 151 generals 306 (BH)	nd 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder surly Engre (BXE _ × 1. Per ale=left Lightan_sed_rose=	st 24 hou l on SNC ben kadrig pope likelmit-Let 10 ² Summary St Summary St S	UTS LISTING DRT BAS RT BAS × + ☆ ₹ C № - Goode abstics ts to to to to to to to to to to	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © ©	Basic Assiyes and Score Be Ext Yow Hotor	Fig. 1.4 ar throughe (ASC) (Gerry Sestills 151 generals 306 (BH)	nd 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder surly Engre (BXE _ × 1. Per ale=left Lightan_sed_rose=	st 24 hour l on SNC dem keding page Hendend-Last 10 Summary St - Season - Lingue Adr - Lingue Adr - Lingue Adr	LIPS LISTING DRT BAS	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. © © © & ASE) [Back] Summary Statistics - Samors - Samors - Samors	Base Analysis and Secon Fie Exit yow Higory A Poblem loading page If 21 388 3.016ee Added 1 aint(1) the Alert Vereid on: The Fatory Mets Criteria 1 aint P Criteria 2 aint	Fig. 1.4 ar throughe (ASC) (Gerry Sestills 151 generals 306 (BH)	nd 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder surly Engre (BXE _ × 1. Per ale=left Lightan_sed_rose=	st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page Houdind-Last 10 Summary St Gaussian - Cast House Stat House Stat House Stat House Stat	Attics Attics ts tis tis tis this	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. ©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©	Base Analysis and Secon Fie Exit yow Higory A Poblem loading page If 21 388 3.016ee Added 1 aint(1) the Alert Vereid on: The Fatory Mets Criteria 1 aint P Criteria 2 aint	Fig. 1.4 ar throughe (ASC) (Gerry Sestills 151 generals 306 (BH)	nd 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder surly Engre (BXE _ × 1. Per ale=left Lightan_sed_rose=	st 24 hour l on SNC dem kedrg page identification Summary St identification Summary St identification Summary St identification Conce Part Destination Conce Par	Attics Attics ts tis tis tis this	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. © © © © © Market State (Back) Summary Statistics • Statests • Indique Alets • Indique Alets	Basic Analysis and Score Ba Bat Yow Hebory Basic Analysis and Score Ba Bat Yow Hebory Basic Analysis and Score Basic Analysis and Score Analysis Basic Analysis and Score	Fig. 1.4 ar Frig. 1.4 ar throug throug type type <thttp: tr="" type<=""> <tht< td=""><td>ad 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder early Engre (BAE _ X _ Ar alor-lat tightm_read_roor : * 1 Deploying ISLas 10 Zimestamp></td><td>st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page Hen keding page Hendent-Let 10 Summary St G Summary St C Summary St Summary S</td><td>Abdress ></td><td>g alerts SE P 1 (Beck)</td></tht<></thttp:>	ad 1,5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder early Engre (BAE _ X _ Ar alor-lat tightm_read_roor : * 1 Deploying ISLas 10 Zimestamp>	st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page Hen keding page Hendent-Let 10 Summary St G Summary St C Summary St Summary S	Abdress >	g alerts SE P 1 (Beck)
Figure 1.3. SNORT home page alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. © © © © Summary Statistics • Senors • Unique Arts • Out • Out	Bask dedyna and Scen En (24, Vew Height) Hoten leadspage If 152,153,0,316e Addr1 i antici hite Aeric Gereiden , Tar Februry Meto Criteria any TCP Criteria any	Fig. 1.4 ar Fig. 1.4 ar throug type base ar base ar base ar base ar base base </td <td>control 1.5 Las control 1.5 Las contro</td> <td>st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page :Bendint-List 10² Stammary St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St St St St St St St St St St St St S</td> <td>LIST LISTING DRT BAS</td> <td>g alerts SE P 1 (Beck)</td>	control 1.5 Las control 1.5 Las contro	st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page :Bendint-List 10 ² Stammary St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St Stammary St St St St St St St St St St St St St S	LIST LISTING DRT BAS	g alerts SE P 1 (Beck)
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. © © © © Summary Statistics • Senors • Unique Arts • Out • Out		Signal (1.4) Court Academic Social Science (1.453) it (Dury Academic Science (1.4	ad 1.5 La gh E-mai at 17 Alors - Musila Fred early Alors - Musila Fred early fore (ASE × 1 Pre atomic training real provider atomic training real provider training for the format of the Copping IS Lest TO * Timestamp * 201242-21 H2012	st 24 hour l on SNC den keding page den keding	is tins is time is is time is i	g alerts SE P 1 (Bock) (Caper AProto-) (C2
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. © © © © © Market State ASE) Summay Statistics • Mayor Pinks • Mayor Pinks • Mayor Pinks • Mayor Pinks • Mayor Pinks • Sauce Andress Source (Destination • Mayor Pinks • Sauce Andress • < First • < Last • • The profile of alerts • Sauce Andress • < First • < Last • • 1 • 2011-12-11 • 2011-12-12 • 17:1918 • 15:554 • 18 • 2011-12-11 • 2011-12-12 • 17:1918 • 15:554	■ Bask Andyna and Seco E B Sit Yew Heavy ■ Poblem loading page ■ 102 1080 3.3 (how Correid on: Tar Fatory: Nets Onters Tark Payload Criteria 299 Payload Criteria 299 P	Fig. 1.4 ar Fig. 1.4 ar throug type base ar base ar base ar base ar base base </td <td>ad 1.5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder early Engre (BAE _ X _ Ar alor-lat tightin _real; uses</td> <td>st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page Hen keding page Hendent-Leit 10⁹ Summary St Cource Part Dispersive Dispe</td> <td>vice set of the set of the</td> <td>g alerts SE P 1 (Beck) (Beck) (Capter Afroto> TOP TOP TOP TOP</td>	ad 1.5 La gh E-mai as 10 Alots - Maila Feder early Engre (BAE _ X _ Ar alor-lat tightin _real; uses	st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page Hen keding page Hendent-Leit 10 ⁹ Summary St Cource Part Dispersive Dispe	vice set of the	g alerts SE P 1 (Beck) (Beck) (Capter Afroto> TOP TOP TOP TOP
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window. © © © © © Market ASE) Summary Statistics Summary Statistics		Signal 1.4 art throug V(cope (LASS) i (Uvery Results 151) (March 1996) Were Seaths 151 (March 1997) V(cope (LASS) i (Uvery Results 1 (March 1997) Base Analysis and Base Analysis and March 1997) ctel 1_202162127 March 1997) toto / 2012 [16 : * * - * ctel 1_2015/16420 * ctel 1_2015/16421 * ctel 1_2015/164227 * ctel 1_2015/16420 * ctel 1_2015/16441[14720] * ctel 1_2015/16441[14720] * ctel 1_2015/1641[14720] * ctel 1_2015/1641[14720] * ctel 1_2015/1641[14720] * ctel 1_2020] *	cd 1.5 La gh E-mail	st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding page Hen keding page Hendent-Leit 10 ⁹ Summary St Cource Part Cource Part Disput ben Cource Part Disput ben Cource Part Disput ben Cource Part Disput ben Cource Part Status 122,184,2124,555 192,184,2124,555 192,184,2124,555 192,184,2124,555 192,184,2124,555	S Listing Status St	g alerts SE P 1 (Back) (Caper Afroto> TOP TOP TOP TOP TOP TOP TOP TOP
Figure 1.3. SNORT home page alerts inside BASE dyna and Security Engine (1451): Alert Lising - Microsoft Internet Explore there Foroities Tools Help	ye Displaying Snort window. 	■ ■	Signature > • Signature > • Signature >	and 1.5 La gh E-mail and 10 Alets Manla Index early Charles Manla Index early Charles (1997 Manla Index early Charles (1997 Manla Index The Index Index Index Company Index Index 201240-21 1617-21 201240-21 1617-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 201240-21 20	st 24 hour Lon SNC bem boding page Hondmit-Last 10 ² Summary St Hondmit-Last 10 ² Summary St H	vice set of the	g alerts SE P 1 (Beck)
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE dyna and Security Engine (BSS): Alert Lising - Microsoft Internet Explore Were Favoites Tods Help	ge Displaying Snort window.	Base Analysis and Secon Fig. 8 (a) Yes and Secon Fig. 8 (b) Yes (b) Yes Fig. 192 (b) 3.3 (b) Control (b)	Signalare > <	cd 1.5 La gh E-mail	st 24 hour l on SNC ben keding pope Hondmit-Last TO Summary St Hondmit-Last TO Summary St Hondmit-Last TO Summary St Hondmit-Last TO Honge Address > Honder Add	C Dest. Address → 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61 192.168.27.045.61	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home page alerts inside BASE	ge Displaying Snort window.	■ ■	Signature > < Signature > <	Lipson Lipson ast TCP Alerts Macale Fred ast TCP Alerts Maca	St 24 hour Lon SNC bem boding page Hondmit-Last 10 ⁻ Summary St Hongen Rim Cases Hongen Rim Hongen Rim Honge	visibles	g alerts SE
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE Alysis and Security frages (IASE) is Aler I living - Microsoft Internet Explore Were Favotes Tota Help Particles Tota Help Particles Tota Help Particles Tota Help Security Statistications - Contains - Security Engline (B Security IEmail aler(s) (50) - on 1 aler(s) (n.25 blobs) Desploying alerts 1-26 of 25 total Criteria and Particles and Criteria and Particles Contains - Contains - Security Statistications - Criteria Particles - Security Statistications - Contains - Security Statistications - Criteria Particles - Criteria Particles - Contains - Contains - Security Statistications - Contains - Secure Address Criteria and Particles - Contains - Contains - Secure Address Particles - Secure - Address Particles - Se	Summary Statistics < First < Last> Summary Statistics (Back 1) (Back 1)	■ ■	Signalare > < Signalare > <td>at 17.5 La gh E-mail at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde auty Ergre (BXE_ ×) arge (BXE ×)</td> <td>St 24 hour Lon SNC ben keding page Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Honore Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Status Address > 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124139 1921146.2124139</td> <td>C Dest. Address → 192.168.27.045.61</td> <td>g alerts SE (bec)</td>	at 17.5 La gh E-mail at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde auty Ergre (BXE_ ×) arge (BXE ×)	St 24 hour Lon SNC ben keding page Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Honore Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Status Address > 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124139 1921146.2124139	C Dest. Address → 192.168.27.045.61	g alerts SE (bec)
Figure 1.3. SNORT home pag alerts inside BASE	Summery Statistics Summery Statistics	■ ■	Signifier (signifier) (b) (signifier) (c) (signifier) (c) <td>cliphing 1.5 Lag gh E-mail ast 107 Alets Mail sat 107 Alets Mail extry types (BAE: X) It extry types (BAE: X) It cols=list types (BAE: X) It</td> <td>St 24 hour Lon SNC dem loading pope </td> <td></td> <td>g alerts SE SE P 1 (Beck) (Bec</td>	cliphing 1.5 Lag gh E-mail ast 107 Alets Mail sat 107 Alets Mail extry types (BAE: X) It extry types (BAE: X) It cols=list types (BAE: X) It	St 24 hour Lon SNC dem loading pope 		g alerts SE SE P 1 (Beck) (Bec
Figure 1.3. SNORT home page alerts inside BASE alerts inside BASE alysis and Security Engine (BAS) : Alert lating. Microsoft Internet Explore: Wer Favates Tots Tots Image and Security Engine (BAS) : Alert lating. Microsoft Internet Explore: Wer Favates Tots Tots Image and Security Engine (BAS) : Alert lating. Microsoft Internet Explore: Wer Favates Tots Tots Image and Security Engine (B Sicc Analysis and Security Engine (B Search Email stafe() (full) - on 1 stafe() (n.25 blobs) Email stafe() (full) - on 1 stafe() (n.25 blobs) Email stafe() (full) - on 1 stafe() (n.25 blobs) Signature : Classifications > Classifications > States for States for States (States for States	Summary Statistics Same Print Summary Statistics Same Print Summary Statistics Sume Print TCP (UPP) Sume Print TCP (UPP) Statistics 1 2011-12:11 1 2011-12:11 1 2011-12:11 1 2011-12:11 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 1 2011-12:12 <	■ ■	Signalare > < Signalare > <td>at 17.5 La gh E-mail at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde auty Ergre (BXE_ ×) arge (BXE ×)</td> <td>St 24 hour Lon SNC ben keding page Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Honore Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Status Address > 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124139 1921146.2124139</td> <td>Image: Second State Image: Second State Image: Second State Image: Second State <td>g alerts SE SE P 1 (Beck) (Bec</td></td>	at 17.5 La gh E-mail at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde at 10° Alots - Mudla Fedde auty Ergre (BXE_ ×) arge (BXE ×)	St 24 hour Lon SNC ben keding page Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Summary St Honomi-Last TO Honore Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Summe Parts Status Address > 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124559 1921146.2124139 1921146.2124139	Image: Second State Image: Second State Image: Second State Image: Second State <td>g alerts SE SE P 1 (Beck) (Bec</td>	g alerts SE SE P 1 (Beck) (Bec

Fig. 1.6 Most Recent 15 alerts TCP on SNORT BASE

Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE) : Alert Listing - M	ozilla Firefox	V 01. 2	, 155uc 2,11	ai-Api 2
Edit View Higtory Bookmarks	Iools Help				
Problem loading page	× Basic Analysis an	d Security Engine	(BASE × 🔔 Problem	loading page	× +
192.168.0.31/base/base_stat_	alerts.php?time_cnt=1&time	[0][0]=+&time[0][1]=>%3D&time[0][2]=0	28time[0][3]=218time[0][🏫 🔻	C 🛃 - Google
Basic Analys	is and Se	ecurity	Fnaine	(BASE)	
		Joanty			
ome Search					
ded 1 alert(s) to the Alert cache					
time >= [02	2 16:18:11	any time1		 Summary Statist Sensors 	tics
Clear	,,, ;			 Unique Alerts 	,
P Criteria any				 (classification Unique addresses 	s) s: Source Destination
ayer 4 Criteria none ayload Criteria any				Unique IP links Source Port: TCI	
ayload cirtoina aily				Destination Port:	TCP UDP
				• Time profile of a	lerts
		Displ	aying alerts 1-11 of 1	1 total	
< Signature > [snort] Snort Alert [1:384:0]	< Classification > misc-activity	< Total # > 3 2(0%)	Sensor # < Source	Address > < Dest. Addres	s > < First > 2012-02-21 15:41
[snort] Snort Alert [1:384:0 [snort] Snort Alert [1:408:0		2(0%) 2(0%)	1	1 1	2012-02-21 15:41
[snort] Snort Alert [1:14782		12(0%)		4 10	2012-02-21 15:40
[snort] Snort Alert [1:2923:		782(11%)		3 2 1 4	2012-02-21 15:28
 [snort] Snort Alert [1:15167 [snort] Snort Alert [1:402:0 		36(0%) 5(0%)		1 4 1 4	2012-02-21 15:52 2012-02-21 15:53
[short] Short Alert [1:396:0		11(0%)	1	1 2	2012-02-21 15:26
[snort] Snort Alert [1:401:0		223 (3%)	1	1 1	2012-02-21 15:23
[snort] Snort Alert [1:399:0		3(0%)	1	1 1	2012-02-21 15:27
 [snort] Snort Alert [1:368:0 [snort] Snort Alert [1:366:0 		2(0%) 2(0%)	1	1 1 1 1	2012-02-21 15:41 2012-02-21 15:41
	, ,	. ,	ACTION		
	{action }	•		Selected ALL on Sci	reen
://192.168.0.31/base/base_stat_ports.p				41	
	Fig. 1.7 T	oday's	Unique	Alerts	
				and the second of	
		P			
-					
			R.		
t					
			л .		
	<u>_</u>				

Fig. 1.8 Graphical Representation

Conclusion

Above paper discuss Intrusion Detection Systems and Intrusion Detection and Prevention systems by using freeware Software SNORT tool which can work as web application. But it is important to understand that application based vulnerabilities are different in each application and cannot be resolved by any generic rule which and is possible in network security. Also, there is no alternative of secure coding; adding such generic rules and protecting application is just one more line of defense and it cannot be considered as alternative of proper input validation. The best approach for any organization is perform penetration testing for application, write SNORT rules to protect temporary precaution against attacks and start modifying code for proper implementation of security. We have studied and observed the attacks on different ports like TCP, UDP etc. and alert the administrator via email about the illegal activities by the intruder in home network.

References

[1] T. H. Ptacek and T. N. Newsham, "Insertion, Evasion ¹⁵
¹⁵⁴¹⁰ Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion ¹⁵⁴¹⁰¹ 201202, ²¹
¹⁵⁴¹⁰ Detection", Secure Networks, Inc., Jan. 1998. ¹⁵²⁰⁰¹ 201202, ¹¹
¹⁵¹⁷⁵ www.aciri.org/vern/Ptacek-¹⁵⁵²⁰ 201202, ¹¹
¹⁵³³ 201202, ¹¹
¹⁵³³ 20120, ¹¹
¹⁵³³

11528112142Sectifing the Organization with Network Behavior 115234420120221152530 11527272012022**Analysis by Jack TIMOFTE Praktike**r

- ^{01 2012:02-31;15,41,02} 01 2012:02-31;15,41,02 01 2012:02-31;15,41,02
- [3] Mimicry Attacks on HostBased Intrusion Detection Systems by David Wagner & Paolo Soto CCS'02, November 18–22, 2002, Washington, DC, USA.
- [4] Dynamic Multi-Layer Signature Based Intrusion Detection System Using Mobile Agents by Mueen Uddin1, Kamran Khowaja2 and Azizah Abdul Rehman in International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.2, No.4, October 2010 PP.129-141.
- [5] Anomaly-based network intrusion detection: Techniques, systems and challenges by P. Garcı'a-Teodoro, J. Dı'az-Verdejo, G. Macia'-Ferna'ndez
 & E. Va'zquez in comp u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 8 (2009) Elsevier PP.18-28
- [6] Deciphering Detection Techniques: Part II
 Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection By Dr.
 Fengmin Gong, Chief Scientist, McAfee Network
 Security Technologies Group Network Associates
 Your Netwok, our business March 2003.
- [7] Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy by Karen Scarfone Paul Hoffman National Institute of standards and Technology sep-2009
- [8] <u>NIST Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention</u> <u>Systems (IDPS)</u>. 2007-02. Retrieved 2010-06-25.
- [9] Robert C. Newman (19 February 2009). <u>Computer</u> <u>Security: Protecting Digital Resources</u>. Jones & Bartlett Learning. pp. 273–. <u>ISBN 9780763759940</u>. Retrieved 25 June 2010.
- [10] Michael E. Whitman; Herbert J. Mattord (2009).
 <u>Principles of Information Security</u>. Cengage Learning EMEA. pp. 289–. <u>ISBN 9781423901778</u>. Retrieved 25 June 2010.

- [11] Intrusion Detection with SNORT: Advanced IDS Techniques Using SNORT, Apache, MySQL, PHP, and ACID by Rafeeq Ur Rehman.
- [12] Network intrusion Detection by Biswanath Mukherjee,L.Todd Heberlein and Karl N.Levitt in IEEE Network –may/june-1194. PP.26-41
- [13] Intrusion Detection with SNORT: Advanced IDS Techniques Using SNORT, Apache, MySQL, PHP, and ACID by Rafeeq Ur Rehman.
- [14] Snort web site at http://www.snort.org