Mobile Ad Hoc Network: A Comprehensive Study and Survey on Intrusion Detection

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ABSTRACT

In Present years, the security issues are most important concerns in mobile ad hoc network. In comparison to wired network the mobile ad hoc network is more exposed to being attacked. Because of its fundamental Properties, such as dynamic topology, limited power and limited bandwidth, it as very hard to achieve absolute security in the mobile ad hoc network. Attack prevention method like encryption and authentication are not enough for reducing the possibilities of attacks. However, these methods are designed to prevent for a set of possible known attacks. These methods are not able to prevent newer attacks that are originated in the existing security measures. For this reason, a second mechanism is needed to detect and response for these newer attacks. The objective of this paper is to explore and to classify current techniques of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) aware MANET. In this paper we have study various intrusion detection techniques in MANET and then the comparison among several researches achievement will be evaluated based on their parameters.

Keywords- Mobile Ad hoc network, Security, Intrusion detection, Survey

1. INTRODUCTION

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is an independent system of mobile stations connected by wireless link to form a network. It does not trust on predefined infrastructure to keep the network connected therefore it is also known as infrastructure less networks. In MANET, each node can exchange information with node in its range and those which are beyond the range can share information using the concept of multi hop communication in which other node receive and transmit the packets [1]. Several multi-hop routing protocols have been suggested for MANET, and most popular ones include: Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [1], Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) [2], Destination- Sequenced

Distance-Vector (DSDV) [3] and Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [4]. In the MANET the network topology may Change rapidly and unpredictably. Due to the nodes mobility, the intrusion detection methods for wired network can not be used for MANETS. Achieving security within ad hoc networks is very tough because of the following reasons [5]

- Varying Topology: In MANET, due to nodes mobility, topology changes very frequently.
- Open and Vulnerable Communication Medium: Many types of attacks are possible in the ad hoc networks such as Packet dropping attack, Resource consumption attack, Fabrication attack, DOS attack, Route invasion attack, node isolation attack, flooding attack, spoofing masquerading, impersonation are possible.
- Roaming in Dangerous Environment: Any malicious node can create hostile attack or deprive all other nodes from providing any service.

Depending upon the technique used, the intrusion detection can be classified in 3 categories:

- Misused or signature based IDS
- Anomaly based IDS;
- Specification based IDS.

Intrusion detection can be described as a process of monitoring activities in a system which can be a computer or a different network. The mechanism that performs this task is called an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [6]. IDS works under following assumptions

- ✤ User and program activities are observable.
- Normal and intrusive activities must have distinct behaviors.

Node mobility on MANET cannot be limited. As results, many IDS solutions have been proposed for wired network, which they are defined on strategic

points such as switches, gateways, and routers, can not be implemented on the MANET. Thus, the wired network IDS characteristics must be changed prior to be implemented in the MANET.

The rest of this paper will be summarizes as follows. Part 2 describes History of the IDS. Types of Intrusion detection on MANET and related work is presented in part 3. In part 4, we present issues and challenges regarding the IDS classification. Finally, we draw the conclusions and future challenges shown in part 5, 6.

2. HISTORY OF IDS

An intrusion-detection system (IDS) can be described as the tools, resources, and methods to help identify, assess, and report unauthorized or unaware network activity. Intrusion detection is typically one part of an overall protection system that is installed around a system or device—it is not a stand-alone protection measure.

Depending on the detection techniques used, IDS can be classified into three main categories [7] as follows

- Signature or misuse based IDS)
- Anomaly based IDS
- Specification based IDS, which it is a hybrid both of the signature and the anomaly based IDS.

In misuse based intrusion detection [4], also known as signature based detection, a pre-written rule or a regular sequence of actions or events are used to match an attack. There are several methods in the signature detection, which they differ in presentation and matching algorithm employed to find the intrusion patterns. The detection approaches, such as expert system [8], pattern recognition [9], colored petri nets [10], and state transition analysis are grouped on the misuse.

In anomaly detection, a normal profile of user is kept in the system and then the captured profile is compared. If IDS found any activity that deviated from the normal profile is detected as anomaly. This detection has several techniques, i.e.: statistics, neural networks, and other techniques such as immunology, data mining, and Chi-square test utilization [11]. Moreover, a good taxonomy of wired IDS was presented by Debar [12].

In Specification based intrusion detection, some set of constraints are defined for correct operation of program and then operations are monitored against define constraints. A mismatch is reported as an attack.

3. TYPES OF INTRUSION DETECTION ON MANET

There are mainly three objectives in this section: attacks, IDS architectures grouping, and researches achievement. The "researches

achievement review" uses several parameters such as the IDS architectures, the detection techniques, the resistance to several attacks type, and the MANET routing protocols.

3.1 ATTACKS IN MANET

The MANET is easily influenced to passive and active attacks [13]. The Passive attacks typically involve only eavesdropping of data, whereas the active attacks involve actions performed by adversaries such as replication, modification and deletion of exchanged data. In particular, attacks in MANET can cause congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent services from working properly or shutdown them completely[26] .Nodes that carry out the active attacks are considered to be malicious, and referred to as compromised, while nodes that just drop the packets ,aim of saving battery life are considered to be *selfish* [[14],[15]]. A selfish node does not participate in the routing protocols and also not forwarding packets in the network. In addition, a compromised node may use the routing *protocol* to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept as in the so called *black hole* attack.

3.2 IDS DESIGN

Based on the network infrastructures, the MANET can be configured to either flat or multilayer. The optimal IDS architecture for the MANET may depend on the network infrastructure itself. There are four main architectures on the network [16], as follows:

- Standalone IDS
- Distributed and Collaborative IDS
- Hierarchical IDS
- Mobile Agent for Intrusion Detection Systems.

In the standalone architecture, the IDS runs on separate to determine the possibility of intrusion attack independently. There is no coordination and no sharing of data among the IDSes on the network. This architecture is best suitable for flat network infrastructure than for multilayered network infrastructure.

In the distributed and collaborative architecture every node in the MANET must participate in intrusion detection and response by having an IDS agent running on them. The IDS agent is fully responsible for detecting and collecting local events and data to identify possible intrusions, as well as initiating a response independently.

The extended version of the distributed and collaborative IDS *is the hierarchical architecture*. This architecture suggests multi-layered network

infrastructures in which the network is divided into clusters. The architecture has cluster heads, in some sense, act as control points which are similar to switches, routers, or gate ways in wired networks.

The mobile agent for IDS architecture uses mobile agents to perform precise and clear task on a nodes behalf the owner of the agents. This architecture allows the distribution of the intrusion detection tasks. There are several advantages using mobile agents [17], for intrusion detection

3.3 RELATED WORK

Many researchers/Scientists have suggested many IDS especially for the MANET, some of them will be discussed in the following paragraph.

In MANET node is *distributed* and *hence* cooperation is required with other nodes, Zhang, Lee, and Huang [[18], [19]] proposed "intrusion detection (ID) and response system". In this proposed architecture model given below, each and every node is fully responsible for detecting signs of intrusion locally and independently, but neighboring nodes can collaboratively investigate in a broader range. Individual IDS agents are placed on each and every node. Each the IDS agent runs independently and monitors local activities. The agent detects intrusion from local investigation and start response. If delicacy is detected in the local data, neighboring IDS agents will cooperatively participate in global intrusion detection actions. These individual IDS agents collectively form the IDS system to protect from attack to the wireless ad-hoc network.



Fig-1: IDS Agent Model

Albers et al. [20] suggest a distributed and collaborative design of IDS by *using mobile agents*. A Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) is implemented on each node for local involve, which can be longer for global concern by cooperating with

other LIDS. Two types of data are exchanged among LIDS: security data and intrusion alerts. In order to examine the possible intrusion, data must be obtained from what the LIDS detect on, along with additional information from additional nodes. difficulties arises can be solved by using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) data located in Management Information Base (MIBs) as an audit data source. Such a data source not only eliminates those difficulties, but also reduces the increase in using additional resources to collect audit data if an SNMP agent is already run on each node. For the methodology of detection, Local IDS Agent can use either anomaly or misuse detection. However, the combination of these two mechanisms will offer the better model. Once the local intrusion is detected, the LIDS initiate a response and inform the other nodes in the network. Upon receiving an alert, the LIDS can protect itself against the intrusion.



Fig 2: LIDS Architecture in a Mobile Node

Kachirski and Guha [21] proposed a multi-sensor intrusion detection system based on mobile agent technology. The system can be further divided into three main parts, each of which shows a mobile agent with certain functionality, i.e.: monitoring, decision-making and initiating a response.



Fig-3: Mobile with Functionality

Sterne et al. [22] further suggested a dynamic intrusion detection hierarchy that is potentially applied to large networks use clustering technique. This method is similar with Kachirski and Guha [21], but it can be comprises more than two levels. nodes on first level are cluster heads, while nodes on the second level are *leaf nodes*. In this model, every node has the task to monitor, log, analyze, respond, and alert or report to cluster heads. The Cluster heads, in addition, must also perform these functions

- Data fusion/integration and data filtering
- Computations of intrusion
- Security Management.



Fig 4: Dynamic Intrusion Detection Hierarchy

Pasquale Donadio, Antonio Cimmino and Giorgio Ventre proposed a Grid based Intrusion Detection System (G-IDS) that uses the basic truth of the Grid computing and use them to the intrusion detection mechanisms, to define a new process capable to secure networks characterized by the varying topology. For this reason they used a distributed traffic analyzer that operates a real-time feedback sharing the results between the neighboring nodes of the network. S.Madhavi and Dr. Tai Hoon Kim [23] developed an Mobile Intrusion Detection System for multi-hop ad-hoc wireless network. In their article the author explain the monitor node whose job is to detect behave badly node. They also explain the method for detecting the packet dropping and packet delaying intrusion attack.S S en proposed a "grammatical evolution approach to intrusion detection on mobile ad hoc networks"[24]. They use artificial intelligence based learning technique to explore design space. The grammatical evolution technique inspired by natural evolution is explored to detect known attacks on MANETs such as DOS attacks and route disruption attacks. Intrusion detection programs are developed for every attack and transmit to every node on the network.

4. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN MANET

A number of restriction and technical difficulties faced by researchers, which are explained in previous section. These general problems must be taken into account for further research in this area to propose new methods for intrusion detection in mobile ad hoc networks and some of these are:

- The mobile ad hoc network does not require any infrastructure so it is very difficult to carry out any kind of centralized management and control.
- To monitor the network activities in coordinated intrusion detection techniques, large numbers of sensors are deployed and finding optimal solution of the sensors requires tactical processing and collecting data from them consumes a lot of network bandwidth.
- Another challenge to mobile ad hoc network is the resource constraint. The wireless channel is bandwidth-constrained and shared among multiple networking entities. While computational capabilities of mobile devices are powered by batteries with its inherent limitation.

✤ In MANETs, the IDS monitor the activities compare them against the security rules and accordingly generate the alarm. Because of the

varying topology of network, most IDS tolerate the false positive and false negative alarm.

IDS is spread over an area and the node itself is not trusted so IDS does not promise to work efficiently and should be should be some trust model

Author(s)	Name	Architectu	Addressed Attacks			Data	Techniq	Routing	Environ	Contributi
Author(s)	Name	Architectu	Au-	Routing	Sel-	Data	Techniq	Routing	Environ	Contributi
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	c		tica-	hole,			detection		ents	
Zhang and	None	Distribute	No	Yes	No	Audit trail	Anomal	AODV,	Simulati	IDS agent
Lee, Y.		d		(misroutin		(event log	у	DSR,	on	for
Huang		and		g,		processing	-	DSDV		collaborati
[19],		collaborati		packet)				on
[23]		ve		dropping)						detection
P. Albers,	LIDS	Distribute	No	No	No	Audit trail	Misuse,	Not	Simulati	Local IDS
O.		d				(event log	anomaly	identifie	on	mobile
Camp [20]		and				processing	-	d		agent
		collaborati)				for
Kachirski	None	Hierarchic	No	No	No	Audit trail	Anomal	Not	Simulati	Hierarchic
and Guha		al				(event log	у	identifie	on	al
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B. Sun,	ZBIDS	Distribute	No	Yes	No	Audit trail	Anomal	DSR	Simulati	Routing
K.Wu, and		d		(Disruptio		(event log	у		on	protocol
U. W.		and		n		processing				protection
Pooch		collaborati		attacks))				from
[25]		ve								disruption

5. CONCLUSION

By using the parameters talk in the previous sections, i.e.: architecture, attacks, and IDS detection techniques the classification among the proposed IDS of MANET can be made. Most the MANET IDSes take care of to have the distributed architectures and their variants. The IDS architecture may depend on the network infrastructure. but the most important thing is the reasons the architecture to be configured in distributed manner. As the nature of MANET, attacks source can be originated from any nodes within the MANET boundaries or nodes of neighboring networks. The main problem of MANET network is lack of central administration. It is difficult for implementing firewall. Delivery packets required collaboration work among the nodes participant network. For these reasons, the IDS of MANET should have characteristics that follow these natures, distributed and collaborative. Zhang [18], Albers [20], and Sun [25] follow this idea. Meanwhile, Kachirski [21] and Sterne [7] use

thevariant of the distributed and collaborative. Advantage using distributed architecture is the security accident can be detected earlier. However, this architecture required huge resources, which is difficult to be implemented in small wireless device as PDA. All attacks exist in wired networks is possible in MANET. MANET has also faces several type of attacks, which are not possible in the traditional wired network, such as selfish attack, black hole attack, sleep deprivation attack and others type of attacks. These attacks occur because of MANET has vulnerable in the use of wireless link, auto-configuration mechanisms, and its routing protocol. The existing MANET IDSes have several methods to detect and to response quickly regarding these attacks. Zhang [18] and Sun [25] proposed the IDSes which were designed for detecting the intrusion activities on the routing protocol of MANET. Albers [20] tried to extend the traditional IDS on MANET to detect incoming telnet

connections and reacted if they originated from outside community's network. Sterne [7] presented a cooperative and distributed IDS that covered conventional attacks. Table 1 shows the summary of the classification of these MANET IDS.

6. FUTURE CHALLANGES

In mobile ad hoc networks, almost all of the intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are structured to be distributed and have a cooperative architecture (see table 1). mostly the proposed research work prefers using anomaly detection approach. Main objective of intrusion detection system is to detect attacks on mobile nodes or intrusions into the networks. However, attackers may try to attack the IDS system itself. As the use of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) has increased in various fields, the main concern in MANETs is security. Wireless ad hoc networks are exposed to being attacked or harmed because of its fundamental properties such as lack of central control, dynamic quality topology, limited resources and open communication. These features introduce new challenges to intrusion detection technology, so achieving security in ad hoc network is more harder compared to wired networks. In this article, we shortly examined the various intrusion detection methods proposed by many authors. We also examine in detail some challenges and problems of intrusion detection in MANET. There is most extreme need of a general foundation for all intrusion detection and supporting activities that can able to make dynamic network conditions. These activities include detecting all types of attack on MANET; collecting, and correlating intrusion events; responding to intrusions; and managing intrusion detection and all related functions to cater for a secure communication.

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