

## Slicing : A Efficient Method For Privacy Preservation In Data Publishing

D. Mohanapriya\*, Dr. T. Meyyappan\*\*

\*(Research scholar ,Department of Computer Science and engineering, AlagappaUniversity, karaikudi

\*\* (Professor, Department of Computer Science and engineering, AlagappaUniversity, karaikudi

### ABSTRACT

In this paper we propose and prove a new technique called “Overlapping Slicing” for privacy preservation of high dimensional data. The process of publishing the data in the web, faces many challenges today. The data usually contains the personal information which are personally identifiable to anyone, thus poses the problem of Privacy. Privacy is an important issue in data publishing. Many organizations distribute non-aggregate personal data for research, and they must take steps to ensure that an adversary cannot predict sensitive information pertaining to individuals with high confidence. Recent work in data publishing information, especially for high dimensional data. Bucketization, on the other hand, does not prevent membership disclosure. We propose an overlapping slicing method for handling high into more than one column; we protect privacy by breaking the association of uncorrelated attributes and preserve data utility by preserving the association between highly correlated attributes. This technique releases no correlations thereby, overlapping slicing preserves better data utility than generalization and is more effective than bucketization in workloads involving the sensitive attribute

**Keywords** :Overlapping slicing, privacy preservation, high dimensional data, privacy techniques

### I. INTRODUCTION

Privacy preserving publishing of microdata has been studied extensively in recent years. Microdata contain records each of which contains information about an individual entity, such as a person, a household, or an organization. Several microdata anonymization techniques have been proposed. The most popular ones are generalization, for k-anonymity and bucketization for diversity. In both approaches, attributes are partitioned into three categories:

- Some attributes are identifiers that can uniquely identify an individual, such as Name or Social Security Number.
- Some attributes are Quasi Identifiers (QI), which the adversary may already know (possibly from other publicly available databases) and which, when taken together,

can potentially identify an individual, e.g., Birthdate, Sex, and Zipcode.

- Some attributes are Sensitive Attributes (SAs), which are unknown to the adversary and are considered sensitive, such as Disease and Salary.

In both generalization and bucketization, one first removes identifiers from the data and then partitions tuples into buckets. The two techniques differ in the next step. Generalization transforms the QI-values in each bucket into “less specific but semantically consistent” values so that tuples in the same bucket cannot be distinguished by their QI values. In bucketization, one separates the SAs from the QIs by randomly permuting the SA values in each bucket. The anonymized data consist of a set of buckets with permuted sensitive attribute values.

### II. RELATED WORKS

In this chapter we discuss about the literature survey and related works done in privacy preserving microdata and their techniques. The main disadvantage of Generalization is: it loses considerable amount of information, especially for high- dimensional data. And also, Bucketization does not prevent membership disclosure and does not apply for data that do not have a clear separation between quasi-identifying attributes and sensitive attributes. Generalization loses considerable amount of information, especially for high- dimensional data. Bucketizations do not have a clear separation between quasi-identifying attributes and sensitive attributes.

C. Aggarwal [1] initially proposed On k-anonymity and curse of dimensionality concept. Where the author [1] proposed privacy preserving anonymization technique where a record is released only if it indistinguishable from k other entities of data. In this paper [1] the authors [1] show that when the data contains a large number of attributes which may be considered quasi-identifiers, it becomes difficult to anonymize the data without an unacceptably high amount of information loss. This is because an exponential number of combinations of dimensions can be used to make precise inference attacks, even when individual attributes are partially specified within a range. In this paper they provide an analysis of the effect of dimensionality on k-anonymity methods. They [1] conclude that when a data set contains a large number of attributes which

are open to inference attacks, and also the author [1] faced with a choice of either completely suppressing most of the data or losing the desired level of anonymity. Thus, the work showed that the curse of high dimensionality also applies to the problem of privacy preserving data mining.

A. Blum[2] et.al., proposed a new framework for practical privacy and they named it as SULQ framework. They[2] consider a statistical database in which a trusted administrator introduces noise to the query responses with the goal of maintaining privacy of individual database entries. In such a database, a query consists of a pair  $(S, f)$  where  $S$  is a set of rows in the database and  $f$  is a function mapping database rows to  $\{0, 1\}$ . The true answer is  $P_{i \in S} f(d_i)$ , and a noisy version is released as the response to the query. Results of Dinur, Dwork, and Nissim show that a strong form of privacy can be maintained using a surprisingly small amount of noise – much less than the sampling error – provided the total number of queries is sublinear in the number of database rows. We call this query and (slightly) noisy reply the SuLQ (Sub-Linear Queries) primitive. The assumption of sublinearity becomes reasonable as databases grow increasingly large. The authors [2] extend the work in two ways. First, they [2] modify the privacy analysis to real-valued functions  $f$  and arbitrary row types, as a consequence greatly improving the bounds on noise required for privacy. Second, they [2] examine the computational power of the SuLQ primitive. They [2] show that it is very powerful indeed, in that slightly noisy versions of the following computations can be carried out with very few invocations of the primitive: principal component analysis,  $k$  means clustering, the Perceptron Algorithm, the ID3 algorithm, and (apparently!) all algorithms that operate in the in the statistical query learning model.

J. Brickell [3] introduced a new anonymization technique called the cost of privacy. In this work, Re-identification is a major privacy threat to public datasets containing individual records. Many privacy protection algorithms rely on generalization and suppression of "quasi-identifier" attributes such as ZIP code and birthdate. Their objective is usually syntactic sanitization: for example,  $k$ -anonymity requires that each "quasi-identifier" tuple appear in at least  $k$  records, while  $l$ -diversity requires that the distribution of sensitive attributes for each quasi-identifier have high entropy. The utility of sanitized data is also measured syntactically, by the number of generalization steps applied or the number of records with the same quasi-identifier. In this paper [3], query generalization and suppression of quasi-identifiers offer any benefits over trivial sanitization which simply separates quasi-identifiers from sensitive attributes. Previous work showed that  $k$ -anonymous databases can be useful for data mining, but  $k$ -anonymization does not guarantee

any privacy. By contrast, we measure the tradeoff between privacy (how much can the adversary learn from the sanitized records?) and utility, measured as accuracy of data-mining algorithms executed on the same sanitized records.

For our experimental evaluation, we use the same datasets from the UCI machine learning repository as were used in previous research on generalization and suppression. Our results demonstrate that even modest privacy gains require almost complete destruction of the data-mining utility. In most cases, trivial sanitization provides equivalent utility and better privacy than  $k$ -anonymity,  $l$ -diversity, and similar methods based on generalization and suppression.

A multidimensional technique was proposed by B.C. Chen et. al [4], which they named as Skyline based technique. Privacy is an important issue in data publishing.

I.Dinur [5] proposed another technique of revealing information while preserving privacy. The authors [5] examine the tradeoff between privacy and usability of statistical databases.

Consider microdata such as census data and medical data. Typically, microdata are stored in a table, and each record (row) corresponds to one individual. Each record has a number of attributes, which can be divided into the following three categories:

1. Identifier: Identifiers are attributes that clearly identify individuals. Examples include Social Security Number and Name.
2. Quasi-Identifier: Quasi-identifiers are attributes whose values when taken together can potentially identify an individual. Examples include Zip-code, Birthdate, and Gender. An adversary may already know the QI values of some individuals in the data. This knowledge can be either from personal contact or from other publicly available databases (e.g., a voter registration list) that include both explicit identifiers and quasi-identifiers.
3. Sensitive Attribute: Sensitive attributes are attributes whose values should not be associated with an individual by the adversary. Examples include Disease and Salary.

TABLE1 – ORIGINAL TABLE

Name	Age	Gender	Zipcode	Disease
Ann	20	F	12345	AIDS
Bob	24	M	12342	Flu
Cary	23	F	12344	Flu
Dick	27	M	12344	AIDS
Ed	35	M	12412	Flu
Frank	34	M	12433	Cancer
Gary	31	M	12453	Flu
Tom	38	M	12455	AIDS

TABLE 2: GENERALIZATION

Age	Gender	Zipcode	Disease
[20-38]	F	12***	AIDS
[20-38]	M	12***	Flu
[20-38]	F	12***	Flu
[20-38]	M	12***	AIDS
[20-38]	M	12***	Flu
[20-38]	M	12***	Cancer
[20-38]	M	12***	Flu
[20-38]	M	12***	AIDS

TABLE 3: BUCKETIZATION

Age	Gender	Zipcode	Disease
[20-27]	*	1234*	AIDS
[20-27]	*	1234*	Flu
[20-27]	*	1234*	Flu
[20-27]	*	1234*	AIDS
[35-38]	*	124**	Flu
[35-38]	*	124**	Cancer
[35-38]	*	124**	Flu
[35-38]	*	124**	AIDS

### III. PROPOSED WORK

In this paper, we present a novel technique called **slicing** for privacy-preserving data publishing. Our contributions include the following.

First, we introduce slicing as a new technique for privacy preserving data publishing. Slicing has several advantages when compared with generalization and bucketization. It preserves better data utility than generalization. It preserves more attribute correlations with the SAs than bucketization. It can also handle high-dimensional data and data without a clear separation of QIs and SAs.

Second, we show that slicing can be effectively used for preventing attribute disclosure, based on the privacy requirement of  $l$ -diversity. We introduce a notion called  $l$ -diverse slicing, which ensures that the adversary cannot learn the sensitive value of *any* individual with a probability greater than  $1/l$ .

Third, we develop an efficient algorithm for computing the sliced table that satisfies  $l$ -diversity. Our algorithm partitions attributes into columns, applies column generalization, and partitions tuples into buckets. Attributes that are highly correlated are in the same column; this preserves the correlations between such attributes. The associations between uncorrelated attributes are broken; this provides better privacy as the associations between such attributes are less-frequent and potentially identifying.

Fourth, we describe the intuition behind membership disclosure and explain how slicing prevents membership disclosure. A bucket of size  $k$

can potentially match  $kc$  tuples where  $c$  is the number of columns. Because only  $k$  of the  $kc$  tuples are actually in the original data, the existence of the other  $kc - k$  tuples hides the membership information of tuples in the original data.

Slicing partitions the dataset both vertically and horizontally. Vertical partitioning is done by grouping attributes into columns based on the correlations among the attributes. Each column contains a subset of attributes that are highly correlated. Horizontal partitioning is done by grouping tuples into buckets.

Finally, within each bucket, values in each column are randomly permuted (or sorted) to break the linking between different columns. The basic idea of slicing is to break the association across columns, but to preserve the association within each column. This reduces the dimensionality of the data and preserves better utility than generalization and bucketization.

Slicing preserves utility because it groups highly correlated attributes together, and preserves the correlations between such attributes. Slicing protects privacy because it breaks the associations between uncorrelated attributes, which are infrequent and thus identifying. Note that when the dataset contains QIs and one SA, bucketization has to break their correlation; slicing, on the other hand, can group some QI attributes with the SA, preserving attribute correlations with the sensitive attribute.

Slicing retains improved data utility than generalization and can be recycled for membership exposure shield. Additional important benefit of slicing is that it can manage data with greater dimension. We depict how slicing can be recycled for attribute exposure protection and build an effective algorithm for calculating the sliced data that comply with the  $l$ -diversity requisite. Slicing conserves enhanced utility than generalization and is more efficient than binning in assignments comprising the sensitive attribute. Slicing can be used to stop membership exposure.




Fig 1: Overall process diagram

First, generalization for k-anonymity suffers from the curse of dimensionality. In order for generalization to be effective, records in the same bucket must be close to each other so that generalizing the records would not lose too much information. However, in high dimensional data, most data points have similar distances with each other, forcing a great amount of generalization to satisfy k-anonymity even for relatively small k's. While bucketization [14], [11], [7] has better data utility than generalization, it has several limitations. Bucketization does not prevent membership disclosure [14]. Because bucketization publishes the QI values in their original forms, an adversary can find out whether an individual has a record in the published data or not. attributes (Birthdate, Sex, and Zipcode). A microdata (e.g., census data) usually contains many other attributes besides those three attributes. This means that the membership information of most individuals can be inferred from the bucketized table.

### 1) Slicing Algorithms:

An effective slicing algorithm to obtain  $\ell$ -diverse slicing is offered. For a given a micro data table  $T$  and two factors  $c$  and  $\ell$ , the algorithm calculates the sliced table that involves of  $c$  columns and gratifies the privacy requisite of  $\ell$ -diversity. Our algorithm involves of three steps: attribute partitioning column generalization and tuple partitioning. The three phases are

#### 1.1 Attribute Partitioning:

Our algorithm divides attributes such that largely related attributes are in the same column. This is better for utility as well as privacy. With respect to privacy, the association of not related attributes shows more identification risks than that of the association of high related attributes since the association of unrelated attribute values is very less common and therefore more identifiable. Thus, it is good to split the associations among uncorrelated attributes to guard privacy. In this step, we first calculate the relations among pairs of attributes and then group attributes on the basis of their correlations.

#### 1.2 Column Generalization

Records are generalized to gratify certain minimum frequency requisite.

#### 1.3 Tuple Partitioning

In the tuple partitioning steps, records are divided into buckets. We change Mondrian algorithm for tuple partition. Not like Mondrian k-anonymity, no other generalization can be related to the records; we make use of the Mondrian for the reason of dividing tuples into buckets.

#### 1.4 Membership Disclosure Protection

Let us first inspect how a challenger can conclude membership data from binning. Since binning liberates the QI values in their real form and more individuals can be solely determined using the QI values, the challenger can easily settle the membership of single individual in the real data by inspecting the regularity of the QI values in the binned information. Precisely, if the regularity is 0, the challenger knows for certain that the individual is not in information.

If the regularity is higher than 0, the challenger knows with good assurance that the individual is in the information, since this similar records must fit to that unique as nearly no further individual has the identical values of QI. The above perception advises that so as to defend data of members, it is necessary that, in the anonymized information, a record in the real information should have a same occurrence as a record which is not present in the original information. Or else, by investigating their occurrences in the data that is anonymized, the opponent can be able to distinguish records in the real information from records that are not present in the original information.

#### 1.5 Sliced Data

Another important advantage of slicing is its ability to handle high-dimensional data. By partitioning attributes into columns, slicing reduces the dimensionality of the data. Each column of the table can be viewed as a sub-table with a lower dimensionality. Slicing is also different from the

approach of publishing multiple independent sub-tables in that these sub-tables are linked by the buckets in slicing.

TABLE 4 ORIGINAL DATA

Name	Age	Gender	Zipcode	Disease
Ann	20	F	12345	AIDS
Bob	24	M	12342	Flu
Cary	23	F	12344	Flu
Dick	27	M	12344	AIDS
Ed	35	M	12412	Flu
Frank	34	M	12433	Cancer
Gary	31	M	12453	Flu
Tom	38	M	12455	AIDS

TABLE 5 SLICED DATA

(Age, Gender, Disease)	(Zip-code, Disease)
20,F,Flu	12345,Flu
24,M,AIDS	12342,AIDS
23,F,AIDS	12344,AIDS
27,M,Flu	12344,Flu
35,M,Flu	12412,Flu
34,M,AIDS	12433,AIDS
31,M,Flu	12453,Flu
38,M,Cancer	12455,Cancer

#### IV. ALGORITHM

Our Algorithm of “Overlapping Slicing”, is presented below:

1. load dataset;
2. attribute partition and column
3. process tuple partition and buckets
4. slicing
5. undergo column generalization
6. do matching buckets
7. duplicate an attribute in more than one columns
8. end;

#### V. VI SIMULATION WORKS/RESULTS

We have simulated our system in Dot NET. We implemented and tested with a system configuration on Intel Dual Core processor, Windows XP and using Visual Studio 2008 (C#.net). We have used the following modules in our implementation part. The details of each module for this system are as follows:




Fig 2: Load the dataset




Fig 3: Execution of Generalization Process




Fig 4 : Execution of Bucketization Process




Fig 5 Resultant of Overlapping Slicing

#### **VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK**

Thus from our theories and implementation we prove that Overlapping Slicing overcomes the limitations of existing techniques of generalization and bucketization and preserves better utility while protecting against privacy threats. Overlapping slicing to prevent attribute disclosure and membership disclosure.

Overlapping Slicing preserves better data utility than generalization and is more effective than bucketization in workloads involving the sensitive attribute.

The general methodology proposed by this work is that: before anonymizing the data, one can analyze the data characteristics and use these characteristics in data anonymization. As our future work we plan to design more effective tuple grouping algorithms. The trade-off between column generalization and tuple partitioning is the subject of future work. The design of tuple grouping algorithms is left to future work.

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